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THE EURO ZONE DEBT CRISIS: WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO RESCUE 
EURO AT ALL? 
(instead of introduction) 
 
In  1962  the  then  Commission  of  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC) 
presided over by the German politician Walter Hallstein presented the first proposals 
for the creation of the European Monetary Union. On the basis of these and on the 
initiative of the President of France Valery Giscard d'Estaing and the Chancellor of 
the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt, the European Council decided in 
1979 to create the European monetary system. This plan acquired a definite shape in 
1992 in the form of the Maastricht Treaty. Now, 12 years after the implementation 
of the system on 1 January 1999, the European Monetary System is on the verge of a 
precipice due to the debts of its member states. Greece alone has accumulated debts 
in  the  total  amount  of  98.2  billion  euros  in  90  banks  which  participated  in  the 
European stress test. Ireland and Portugal owe 52.7 and 43.2 billion to the same 
banks.
1 Besides, there are the debts to banks of the  considerably larger euro zone 
countries, such as Italy and Spain. If the government loans of the countries which 
are struggling up to their ears in debt had been recorded in the balance sheets at the 
actual day rates, the equity level of the banks had bee n considerably lower and the 
banks would probably have failed the stress test. 
 
We can raise the question here about the actual importance of government loans for 
banks. Government loans ensure the required liquidity for banks as government 
bonds can be easily sold at normal times, the more so as the European Central Bank 
accepts such bonds for security in the case of refinancing. On the other hand, interest 
revenue can be earned from bonds and this is of particular importance to such 
financial institutions where the proportion of deposits from customers is higher than 
the demand for credit as it often is in German savings banks and other cooperative 
financial institutions. The importance of government loans will increase even more 
in the future when banks will have to keep a mandatory minimum liquidity reserve 
in the form of such government debt according to the Basel III rules (new solvency 
requirements for banks). 
 
While before the beginning of the debt crisis government loans were regarded as a 
relatively solid investment, it currently applies only to the emissions of a decreasing 
number of countries. Increase in government debts is approaching a risky limit and 
countries are increasingly threatened by insolvency, which will happen as soon as 
their  credit  risks  are  evaluated  as  increasingly  higher  in  financial  markets. 
Considering all this we have to emphasize even more the importance of overcoming 
the current debt problems as soon as possible. 
 
Greece with its debt burden of 350 billion euros is at the head of the ranking of such 
member states of the European Monetary System which are threatened by national 
bankruptcy. 
 
                                                                  
1 (in German:) Handelsblatt 20.07.2011, p. 6   19 
Apart from the different measures adopted at the crisis summit of 17 euro zone 
countries on 21 July 2011, three main models can be considered to ensure sustained 
endurance of the debt burden. 
 
 The general public has often discussed withdrawal of Greece from the European 
Monetary  System.  At  first  sight  this  seems  to  be  the  easiest  and  also  the  most 
appropriate  solution  for  many.  But  we  have  to  take  into  account  the  drastic 
devaluation  that  reintroduction  of  the  former  Greek  currency  drachma  would 
immediately cause. While it would increase the competitiveness of Greek economy, 
it would be of no use for the national exports as long as there are no sufficient 
industries which could produce according to the requirements of the world market, 
e.g. its own pharmaceutical or supply industry. On the other hand, products imported 
to  Greece  would  become  drastically  more  expensive.  Devaluation  would  be 
particularly devastating since all liabilities of Greece have been denominated in euro 
which would increase the debt burden for many times in a moment. And then the 
national bankruptcy would be unavoidable. 
 
The domestic consequences would also be as catastrophic. Drastic devaluation of 
drachma would destroy the bank deposits of the population and bring along the 
insolvency  of  numerous  companies.  Banks  would  be  the  first  to  suffer  as  their 
investments in government debt are approximately a double of their equity. Already 
an announcement of the reintroduction of the drachma would cause a bank run as 
people would want to withdraw their deposits in euros in time, which in its turn 
would cause instant insolvency of Greek banks (outflow of deposits from banks has 
increased already now). 
 
Withdrawal of Greece would be no solution for the debt problem for the European 
Monetary System as a whole either. On the contrary – withdrawal of Greece would 
mean a huge shock for the euro zone and the related replicating or domino effect 
would have consequences that are comparable to an extensive fire. It would violate 
one of the basic principles of the Monetary Union and would have a long-lasting 
effect. It would make it possible to consider also the withdrawal of other countries 
from the euro zone, with consequences similar to those described above, and due to 
higher risks such speculations would increase the cost of borrowing in financial 
markets also for other countries struggling under the loan burden. Considering all 
these reasons it is absolutely necessary to settle the debt crisis within the euro zone. 
 
  Experts  of  national  economy  prefer  the  method  of  cutting  debts,  i.e.  debt 
restructuring (“haircut”).
2 Such a “haircut” would be extremely risky for Greece as 
financial markets “hold long grudges” so-to-say and do not forgive anything easily. 
According  to  the  results  of  an  German-Argentine  joint  survey  which  covers  the 
                                                                  
2 A figurative term “haircut” is used in English literature in that context as the hair will be also 
shorter after such a cut. The origin of such a term is unclear. It has only been used in the last 
two  decades  after  occurring  first  in  papers  on  financial  markets  published  in  American 
Economic Review in 1989. In the case of a “haircut”, the creditor gets, for instance, only 30 
euros of its initial claim of 100 euros; the extent of the haircut is 70 per cent in such a case.   20 
period 1970–2010 and 68 countries, “Countries which do not repay their debts in 
due time, …get a long-term and harsh punishment.”
3 The survey shows that even 
five years after using the “haircut” method the “punishing mark-up” (higher interest 
rate for risk) has only decreased by a half, i.e. the negative effect of debt cutting is 
expected to be rather considerable also in the shorter term. 
 
The  positive  effect  of  the  debt  reduction  model  described  is  that  after  such  an 
operation the main burden will remain on the shoulders of private owners of the 
government debt – above all banks, insurance companies and funds. We have to 
note,  however,  that  after  cutting  the  debts  it  will  be  necessary  to  decrease  and 
therefore write off the value of such receivables in balance sheets of businesses 
sooner or later and this will reduce the profits and therefore the payment of taxes to 
the state budget. Thus this chalice will not pass from the taxpayers eventually.
4 As 
Greek banks are holding such bonds, they will bear such losses and they will 
presumably have to be rescued as institutions important for the system by injecting 
fresh capital, which in turn will burden the whole European Community.  
 
  The  third  main  model  consists  in  the  restructuring  of  debts.  Holders  of 
government  bonds  will  have  the  opportunity  to  exchange  their  claims  against  a 
country which is deep in debt for bonds of a supranational institution. In the case of 
Greece as a member of the European Monetary System, the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) would be such a rescue fund
5. If we exclude a combination 
with cutting debts, the euro zone rescue fund  EFSF would take Greek government 
bonds over at 100 per cent of their nominal value. Private creditors would receive 
EFSF bonds guaranteed by euro zone countries, i.e.  de facto eurobonds for these. 
Greek  bonds  which  would  now  be  held  by  the  European  rescue  fund  would  be 
restructured into new Greek government bonds, adjusting their terms and conditions 
to the insecure economic situation of Greece. Continuing of these bonds would, 
however, force Greece to follow a policy of strict economy and budgetary discipline.  
 
In order to contribute to at least partial relief from debt by such a restructuring of 
debts  and  in  order  to  involve  also  private  economy  in  the  process,  the  debt 
restructuring  should  be  combined  with  cutting  debts  by  20%
6  to 50%
7. As this 
                                                                  
3 Cf here: Cruces, Juan/Trebesch, Christoph >Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts<, Juli 
2011, handelsblatt.com/link. – The authors studied 182 cases in total, involving 68 countries, 
where such countries defaulted on their payment obligations. They reached the conclusion that 
when the governments of the countries concerned borrowed from the financial markets again in 
the following period, they were so-to-say punished with higher interest rates which depended 
on the amount of the total debt and the extent of debt cutting. 
4 This particularly applies to banks which are fully or partly state-owned. 
5 European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which is planned to be replaced permanently by 
the European stabilisation mechanism (ESM) by 2013. The respective legal provisions should 
be amended first to allow EFSF to purchase government bonds. 
6  IIF (Institute of Internatio nal Finance) has made its proposal for approximately such a 
percentage. 
7 The Technical Advisory Committee of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
has requested the cutting of debts by approximately a half.   21 
concerns Greek banks, they have to be supported with additional rescue measures. 
Cutting  of  debts  will  alleviate  the  situation  of  the  European  rescue  fund  and 
therefore the fund itself will be able to alleviate the situation of Greece which can 
decrease  its  debts  and  lower  interest  payment  liabilities.  The  remaining  debt  of 
Greece to the European rescue fund EFSF can then be restructured – similar to the 
case described above – into new bonds with more favourable credit terms
8. 
 
Rating agencies have let it be underst ood that they would treat debt cutting as a 
default and respond to it by reducing the evaluation of the financial situation 
(default-rating). As a consequence, the expenditures of Greek for obtaining funds 
from capital markets would still remain high and m ight even increase.
9 In order to 
avoid that, involvement of the private economy through bank taxes or other similar 
taxes could be considered instead of following the haircut method.
10  
 
If imposing bank taxes would concern only well-functioning banks and they would 
remain  within  affordable  limits,  it  would  be  questionable  whether  it  would  be 
enough for considerable alleviation of the debt burden of Greece. Therefore bank 
taxes  should  be  combined  with  so-to  say  “soft  restructuring  of  debts”.  Two 
possibilities are considered. The first method would help to temporarily alleviate the 
situation of Greece, even if with respect to current payment obligations only. The 
terms of the restructured debts could be considerably extended, lower interest rates 
established and deadlines for the payment of interests deferred. The second method 
would consist in allowing Greece with credits from the European rescue fund EFSF 
to buy back its own bonds which are currently offered well below their nominal 
value on the after-markets. If holders of these bonds sold them, it would summa 
summarum alleviate the debt burden of Greece and relieve it from further interest 
payments and debt repayments.
11 
 
In conclusion we have to admit that there are no definite recipes for overcoming the 
debt crisis. Therefore it is not possible yet at the moment to assess the effectiveness 
                                                                  
8 Here the terms of 15 to 30 years have been discussed for the loans. According to the decisions 
of the crisis summit of the leaders of 17 heads of state of the euro zone in July this year, the 
term will be extended from 7.5 years to at least 15 years and the interest rates will be lowered 
from 4.5% to 3.5%. 
9 In order to break the huge  – actually irresponsible – influence of rating agencies which is 
particularly evident at times of crisis when the often unfathomable evaluations of agencies may 
lead to dramatic aggravation of the situation, the EU Commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding 
demanded the liquidation of such agencies. The German President Christian Wulff does not 
present such radical demands, however. He suggested that rating agencies should be made 
responsible if their evaluations cause significant financial damage. – It is questionable, though, 
how  the  claims  for  damages  could  be  convincingly  quantified  to  have  grounds  for  their 
execution.  
10  As that would create the possibility to prevent  rating agencies from increasing their 
evaluations of the credit risk. 
11 The question remains here surely about whether or not rating agencies would interpret such 
an action after all as forcing them to give up claiming the debts and would lower the evaluation 
of the financial situation as a consequence (default).    22 
of the decisions adopted at the debt conference held at the end of July this year. 
Quite a few points will probably need to be specified and also expanded before 
starting their implementation.  
 
Considering the risks described, the method of soft restructuring of debts has the 
best  prospects  to  succeed  in  our  opinion  when  combined  with  the  simultaneous 
imposition  of  the  bank  tax.  The  reason  lies  in  the  urgent  need  to  stop  further 
aggravation of the debt problems of Greece in order to win some time that way for 
taking additional measures required for the achievement of sustainable economic 
growth. In the future, Greece will have to be able to bear its own debt burden and 
also  to  repay  the  debts  in  the  long  term.  Here  the  issue  is  not  so  much  about 
implementation  of  strict  austerity  measures  as  about  the  development  of  new 
competitive industries, with simultaneous fundamental enhancement of the private 
business  environment.  Above  all,  more  legal  certainty
12  and general cutting of 
bureaucracy  should  be  considered  –  particularly  with  respect  to  foreign 
investments
13 –, also fighting against corruption and favouritism, opening of the 
currently  regulated  markets,  privatisation  of  state  enterprises,  creation  of  a 
transparent and competitive taxation system
14 and also clear salary structures. In 
addition to these basic truths it is urgently necessary to expand mid - and long-term 
growth  perspectives  by  expanding  the  existing  and  creating  n ew  cooperation 
opportunities with other EU Member States. Promising investment opportunities can 
be  found  in  such  areas  as  infrastructure,  renewable  energy  (particularly  solar 
technology  in  the  form  of  photovoltaic  cells),  construction  of  power  stations, 
development  of  cross -border  networks,  information  technology,  transport, 
telecommunications,  waste  management  and  tourism.  For  the  financing  of 
development programmes it is intended to increase the resources of EU Structural 
Funds and to direct the funds pl anned for Greece above all for the support of 
economic  growth  and  competitiveness  of  the  state.  It  is  also  possible  for  the 
European Investment Bank (EIB)
15 to alleviate problems related to the required co-
financing if Greece is not able to pay its own contribution required. 
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12 Among other things, with land registers. 
13 For instance, issuing of activity licences is too complicated and time -consuming in Greece 
and fulfilment of contracts and agreements often uncertain. 
14 This has to be accompanied by strict fight against tax fraud. 
15  The  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  is  a  EU  institution  which  supports  long -term 
investments. 